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Although codification of the law of evidence brought a desirable
measure of certainty and predictability, many of the Federal Rules of
Evidence were designed to provide flexibility by vesting considerable
discretion in the trial judge. Rule 103 always contemplated that only
harmful errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence are of any im-
portance.' Moreover, the operation of other principles, such as the con-
temporaneous objection rule2 and the giving of limiting instructions,
5
provide additional justifications for diminished appellate scrutiny of evi-
dentiary matters. These principles sometimes operate to exempt evi-
dentiary rulings from appellate review altogether. The misapplication
of evidentiary rules rarely causes the reversal of a case,4 and the rules
often appear to operate more like suggestions than rules.
In reviewing the cases of the Tenth Circuit dealing with evidentiary
matters, one finds a great deal ofjudicial energy expended to justify the
affirmance of cases in which the trial court has significant discretion.
The scope of appellate review is to identify only those trial court deci-
sions that constitute abuses of discretion. However, even an abuse of
discretion can be characterized as harmless error, so the strength of the
case on the merits supersedes enforcement of the rules. Lost in the pro-
cess are appellate interpretations and explications of the law of evi-
dence,5 and the atmosphere is one in which even prosecutorial
misconduct involving the violation of evidentiary rulings has no opera-
tional consequence.
6
* Sheila K. Hyatt, B.A., J.D., is a Professor of Law at University of Denver College
of Law.
1. FED. R. EVID. 103(a) provides: "Efect of erroneous riding. Error may not be predi-
cated upon a ruling which admits or excluded evidence unless a substantial right of the
party is affected." The Tenth Circuit stated in United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462,
1469 (10th Cir. 1990), "[a] non-constitutional error is harmless unless it had a 'substantial
influence' on the outcome or leaves one in 'grave doubt' as to whether it had such effect"
(quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)).
2. FED. R. EvID. 103(a)(1) provides that error must be harmful and a timely objection
or motion to strike must appear in the record, with a specific ground stated.
3. FED. R. EVID. 105 provides that the court shall give limiting instructions restricting
the evidence to its proper scope when requested.
4. Of over 2000 cases decided in the federal courts from July 1, 1988 to June 30,
1990, only 30 cases were found in which a court of appeals stated in an officially reported
opinion that its reversal was due to an evidentiary error at trial. Marget A. Berger, When, If
Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute Reversible Error?, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 893, 894 (1992).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1991); McEwen v. City
of Norman, Okl., 926 F.2d 1539 (10th Cir. 1991).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Short, 947 F.2d 1445 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v.
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The Tenth Circuit cases involving evidentiary matters are, as might
be expected, concentrated in those areas where the trial court retains
the most discretion, and the evidence has the most impact. Cases about
extrinsic acts7 and expert witnesses are the most frequently litigated.
Part I of this article examines the relevance rules with particular empha-
sis on extrinsic acts under Rule 404(b). Part II focuses on Rules 608 and
609, which also deal with extrinsic acts. Part III deals with issues involv-
ing expert witnesses and part IV reviews the Tenth Circuit's hearsay
cases.
I. RELEVENCE AND RuLE 404(B)
Trial judges in criminal cases rarely exclude significant evidence
proffered by the defense solely on Rule 403 grounds. 8 The Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed the trial judge who did so in United States v. Willie9 , but over
a dissent. In this case, the United States prosecuted a Native American
"tax protester" for failure to file income tax returns. The defendant as-
serted a sincere, good faith belief that he need not file a tax return,
which is relevant to the willfulness of his violation. In support of his
defense, the defendant, Willie, sought to introduce (1) a copy of the
United States Constitution, (2) a History of Congress from 1792, (3)
pages of the session laws, (4) a Navajo Treaty, (5) the Coinage Act of
1965, and (6) letters from Willie to the Departments of Justice and the
Treasury setting forth his contention that the tax laws do not apply to
him as an Indian. The trial court excluded all the exhibits on the
grounds that they would confuse the jury and would be subject to mis-
use; the court wanted to avoid the presentation of "law" to the jury that
was different from what the judge would later instruct. The Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed the trial court,10 differentiating between the material's rel-
evancy to the sincerity of defendant's belief that he need not file a
return, and the sincerity of his belief that he should not need to file a
return. Since only the former would be a proper purpose, the Court
Lonedog, 929 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1991). See also Viligia Bilaisis, Note, Harmess Error: Abet-
tor of Courtroom Misconduct, 74J. CalM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 457, 475 (1983).
7. The term "extrinsic acts" encompasses evidence of similar happenings under FED.
R. EvID. 401 and 403; prior acts under FED. R. EVID. 404(b); prior acts relevant to credibil-
ity under FED. R. EVID. 608 and prior crimes to impeach a witness under FED. R. EVID. 609.
8. FED. R. EVID. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." When there is no prejudice involved, the
exclusion of defendant's evidence for trial management concerns implicates the due pro-
cess clause. "The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the
right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations." Chambers v. Missis-
sippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
9. 941 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1991).
10. The discussion on the merits of the admissibility of this evidence was actually an
alternative holding. Id. at 1391. The majority also found that the exclusion of the evi-
dence was proper due to Willie's inadequate offer of proof under FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(2),
the absence of plain error under FED. R. EVID. 103(d) and because the error, if any, was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
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ruled that the danger of jury confusion" outweighed the probative
value.
The dissenting opinion by Judge Ebel straightforwardly asserted
that evidence of statutory provisions, legislative history and similar offi-
cial documents supported the reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs
and were evidence that such beliefs were sincerely held. 12 Despite the
compelling directness of the dissenting opinion, the majority was con-
cerned about tax protesters and the burdens they might place on the
courts. The majority feared the "slippery slope" and the prospect that a
defendant might attempt to present the "accumulated weight of material
presented at a two-week ['tax education'] seminar.. . ."13 It is worth
noting, however, that there was no such problem in this case, but none of
defendant's documents were admitted. Concern about voluminousness
or cumulativeness evidence may be addressed under Rule 403. Exclud-
ing all of the material that corroborated the sincerity of the defendant's
views was neither necessary nor fair.
Much more common than Rule 403 cases14 are cases decided under
Rule 404(b). That rule is designed to control the admission of a special
type of character evidence by excluding prior "bad acts" of a person
unless such evidence has probative value with respect to some issue
other than the person's character. 15 Trial court decisions under this
rule generate the most litigated evidentiary issue on appeal, which is not
surprising given the profound impact such evidence has on juries.'
6
11. Id. at 1398.
12. Id. at 1401-2.
13. Id. at 1397.
14. The Tenth Circuit decided a few other cases on FED. R. EvID. 403 grounds. See
generally United States v. Martinez, 938 F.2d 1078 (10th Cir. 1991) (one-half pound of
cocaine, cash, a gun, and a scale recovered from house at which defendant stopped min-
utes before defendant sold cocaine to an undercover agent was admitted as "tools of the
trade" evidence not outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice in cocaine distribution and
conspiracy charge); Bingman v. Natkin & Co., 937 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1991) (allowing
admission of evidence that two 60-year-old workers were laid off one year after the dis-
charged employee, plaintiff in action, pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act); United States v. Haar, 931 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding the probative value of
admitting evidence of a chemical catalog found in a storage locker rented by defendant
convicted of methamphetamine production is not outweighed by risk of unfair prejudice).
15. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) provides:
(b) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
16. In a National Science Foundation project, the researchers studied the impact of
certain kinds of evidence on groups of lawyers and laypersons. While these groups' re-
sponses were surprisingly divergent, the greatest agreement was found in connection with
evidence suggesting other immoral conduct by the defendant. Such evidence was consist-
ently rated as prejudicial. See Lee E. Teitelbaun, et. al., Evaluating the Preudicial Effect of
Evidence: Can Judges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence onJuries?, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 1147.
See also James E. Beaver & Steven L. Marques, A Proposal to Modify the Rule on Criminal
Conviction Impeachment, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 585 (1985). In this study, the authors cite primary
research demonstrating that jurors nearly universally use the defendant's prior criminal
record to conclude that the defendant was immoral and was therefore likely guilty of the
crime charged. Additionally, the authors point to clinical research showing that jurors are
unable to follow limiting instructions and that evidence of a prior criminal record nega-
1992]
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While the admission of extrinsic acts under Rule 404(b) is discretionary
in the trial court, a very specific methodology for exercising discretion
was established by the higher courts. The United States Supreme Court
decision in Huddleston v. United States 1 7 and the Tenth Circuit's opinion
in United States v. Record 1 8 reflect the current standards for decision mak-
ing under Rule 404(b).1 9
As with other evidentiary rules, the necessity for procedural requi-
sites, the plain and harmless error rules20 and the giving of limiting in-
structions 2 1 all serve to insulate the trial courts' decisions from appellate
interference. In United States v. Sanders,2 2 a RICO prosecution, the Tenth
Circuit assumed, arguendo, that evidence of five different extrinsic bad
acts of the defendant was erroneously admitted, but found either the
defendant failed to object to the testimony offered, which operates as a
waiver, or the court gave a limiting instruction, which "presumptively
cur[es] any prejudicial impact on defendant." 28 With respect to the one
instance where uncharged misconduct was admitted over defendant's
objection and without the court giving a requested limiting instruc-
tion, 24 the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and found the cumu-
lative effect of all of the assumed errors did not affect the defendant's
substantial rights.
25
Similarly, although United States v. Cardal126 requires the trial court
to articulate precisely the basis for admission of extrinsic bad act evi-
dence in a criminal trial, the failure to adhere to this requirement is
harmless error if the decision to admit the evidence is deemed correct
on appeal. Thus, in United States v. Morgan,27 the admission of extrinsic
tively affects even those jurors who attempt to avoid any prejudicial impact of the evi-
dence. For another study reaching essentially the same conclusions, see Roselle L. Wissler
& Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions, 9 LAw & HuM. BEHAVIOR, 37
(1985).
17. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
18. 873 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1989).
19. According to Huddeton, protection against unfair prejudice from extrinsic act evi-
dence emanates from four sources:
[F]irst, from the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be offered for a
proper purpose; second, from the relevancy requirement of Rule 402- as en-
forced through Rule 104(b); third, from the assessment the trial court must make
under Rule 403 to determine whether the probative value of the similar acts evi-
dence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice .... and
fourth, from Federal Rule of Evidence 105, which provides that the trial court
shall, upon request, instruct thejury that the similar acts evidence is to be consid-
ered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted.
485 U.S. at 691-92.
20. FED. R. EVID. 103(a) & (d).
21. FED. R. EvID. 105.
22. 928 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1991).
23. Id. at 942 (citing United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d 844, 859 (10th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, Hines v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 348 (1989)).
24. The court noted that the defendant did not request a limiting instruction, nor did
he formally move to strike the testimony. Id. at 942 n.1.
25. Id. at 943.
26. 885 F.2d 656, 671 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d
1426, 1436 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1081 (1986)).
27. 936 F.2d 1561 (10th Cir. 1991).
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act evidence was affirmed, although there was no precise articulation of
the proper purpose for which the evidence was offered.
Morgan provides an interesting illustration of the difficulties en-
countered in the search for a "proper purpose" under Rule 404(b). In
Morgan, the defendant was on trial for bank robbery. A witness was per-
mitted to testify that the defendant participated in another (uncharged)
bank robbery several weeks earlier. The Court stated, "The two robber-
ies involved many similarities: both times a stolen car was used to drive
to the banks; both involved robbers who wore masks made out of sweat
pants; weapons were used in both; and the maroon-colored El Camino,
which Mr. Morgan was in just prior to his arrest, was seen in the Bixby
area following the robbery." 28 Noting that prior uncharged acts have
probative value particularly when the act is "close in time and similar in
method to the charged scheme," 29 the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
evidence was offered for a proper purpose. Absent from the court's rea-
soning was an explanation of how the defendant's participation in the
prior bank robbery made it more probable that he participated in the
charged bank robbery - besides showing defendant's "propensity" to
rob banks, which is precisely the purpose forbidden by Rule 404. The
admission of the prior bank robbery proved one thing: the defendant
was a bank robber and, therefore, probably robbed the bank. The trial
court's limiting instruction demonstrated the illogic of finding a proper
purpose for admitting this testimony: the jury was told to consider the
evidence of the similar act "in determining the state of mind or the in-
tent with which the Defendant, Mr. Morgan, did the acts that are
charged here in the indictment."'30 The instruction told the jury that the
prior bank robbery demonstrated a bank-robbing state of mind or in-
tent. Larcenous intent was not an issue in the case, therefore the jury
would be likely to use the similar act as evidence of the defendant's
character.
A proper purpose for admitting extrinsic act evidence was found in
United States v. Esparsen,31 where a witness was permitted to testify that
one of the defendants threatened harm to the witness's children if she
was the one "ratting" on him. Although this evidence constituted an-
other crime, wrong or act under Rule 404(b), the court upheld its admis-
sibility to show the defendant's guilty knowledge or consciousness of
guilt. However, the trial court denied defendant's request that the jury
be instructed to consider the defendant's threats as proof of knowledge,
not as evidence of a violent person likely to commit illegal acts. The
Tenth Circuit ruled that the defendant was entitled to such an instruc-
tion, but the failure was harmless error because other evidence of de-
fendant's guilt was substantial and because the prosecutiofi did not
argue to the jury that they should consider the threat as evidence of the
28. Id. at 1572 (emphasis added).
29. Id. (quoting United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1375 (10th Cir. 1989)).
30. Id. at 1573 n.5.
31. 930 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1991).
19921
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defendant's propensity to commit crimes.3 2
Drug cases present many problems under Rule 404(b), but are fer-
tile ground for the appropriate admission of extrinsic act evidence be-
cause knowledge and intent are often at issue. In United States v.
Jefferson,33 the defendant was a passenger in a car found to contain
drugs. The defendant denied knowledge of the drugs. The driver, who
had turned state's evidence, was permitted to testify about other trips
with the defendant to purchase drugs in California for distribution in
Denver. The prior acts were probative of the defendant's knowledge
under Rule 404(b), particularly since the defendant denied such knowl-
edge. Similarly, in United States v. Poole,34 a large quantity of crack co-
caine was found hidden in the defendant's restaurant. The defendant
denied his possession of the drugs and any intent to distribute the
drugs. Federal agents were permitted to testify to prior undercover
drug deals they made with the defendant or observed him making. The
Court analyzed the appropriate factors under Huddleston,3 5 noting an ap-
propriate limiting instruction, and affirmed the admission of the evi-
dence on the issues of knowledge and intent.
Sometimes, of course, prior acts are not really extrinsic to the crime
charged. In United States v. Treff,36 the defendant was on trial for throw-
ing a molotov cocktail at the house of his former supervisor at the Inter-
nal Revenue Service. The prior act admitted by the trial court had
occurred two and one-half hours earlier on the same night-the defend-
ant had shot and killed his wife. The court determined that although it
was a close question, the act of killing his wife was not extrinsic to the
charged crime, and Rule 404(b) did not apply to an act so inextricably
intertwined with the crime charged that testimony concerning the
charged crime would be confusing and incomplete without mention of
the prior act.
3 7
The trial judge in United States v. Zimmerman3 8 failed to delineate
between extrinsic acts under Rule 404(b) and direct (but inadmissible)
evidence of the crime charged. In that case, the defendant lawyer was
convicted of conspiring to defraud the creditors of a bankruptcy client
by helping to hide assets. The government introduced out-of-court
statements of one bankruptcy judge who, in the course of adjudicating
the bankruptcy proceedings, opined that the law firm appeared either to
be acting unethically or participating in an illegal conspiracy. A second
bankruptcy judge referred the matter to the U.S. Attorney's office for
possible prosecution, and the government introduced that letter as well.
The trial judge admitted the evidence to show the defendant's "knowl-
edge and intent" under Rule 404(b) and instructed the jury accordingly.
32. Id. at 1476.
33. 925 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1991).
34. 929 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1991).
35. See United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
36. 924 F.2d 975 (10th Cir. 1991).
37. Id. at 981.
38. 943 F.2d 1204 (10th Cir. 1991).
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The Tenth Circuit noted that the documents were not Rule 404(b) evi-
dence at all, since they were not evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts;
rather, they were hearsay opinions of two judges who believed the de-
fendant, or his law firm, was guilty of the crimes for which he was on
trial.3 9 The conviction was reversed because of the highly prejudicial
character of the evidence.
Although the erroneous admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) is
the ground most often asserted for reversal, the erroneous exclusion of
such evidence may be grounds for reversal as well. In Turley v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. ,40 the plaintiff sued his insurer for failure
to pay for the theft of his car. The insurer sought to introduce testimony
of the plaintiff's ex-wife, which would reveal numerous fraudulent in-
surance claims the plaintiff previously filed, including a false slip and fall
claim orchestrated by the plaintiff and one Brigman, who was also con-
nected to the instant case as lessee of the claimed stolen car. The trial
court excluded the evidence because the insurer had not sufficiently ar-
ticulated a proper purpose under Rule 404(b), but the Tenth Circuit
reversed, holding that the "articulation" requirement was not indispen-
sable and that the prior insurance scam bore on the defense theory of
fraud, on Brigman's knowledge, on Brigman's intent and absence of an
accident or mistake in his dealings with State Farm, and on plaintiff's
knowledge of the same. 4 1 Quoting the revisionist interpretation of Rule
404(b) found in Huddleston, the court declared that the thrust of Rule
404(b) was that evidence of other acts was admissible and that "Con-
gress [in enacting 404(b)] was not nearly so concerned with the prejudi-
cial effect of Rule 404(b) evidence as it was with ensuring that
restrictions would not be placed on the admission of such evidence."
'4 2
The attitude favoring admissibility of extrinsic act evidence was ap-
parent in United States v. Lonedog.4 3 In that rape prosecution case, the
defendant asserted that the complaining witness consented to inter-
course. Through various witnesses, the following prior acts of the de-
fendant were either established or were the subject of a question put by
the prosecution: Defendant hit his former wife with a flashlight; his for-
mer wife filed a complaint of rape against him; his former wife wrote a
letter to the social services department complaining about him; defend-
ant served time in prison; defendant pointed a gun at a person unrelated
to the instant case, and that defendant had "a reputation" on the Indian
reservation. Some of this matter came in without objection, some over
sustained objections with curative instructions given. After analysis for
abuse of discretion and review for plain and cumulative error, the court
ultimately concluded that despite the often unprofessional behavior of
the prosecution, "the errors were effectively cured and that the jury pos-
39. Id. at 1211-12.
40. 944 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1991).
41. Id. at 675.
42. Id. at 675 (quoting United States v. Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681, 688-89 (1988)).
43. 929 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S.Ct. 164 (1991).
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sessed ample evidence to convict. ' '
4 4
Extrinsic acts are also governed by Rule 412 in the context of sexual
assault. This highly specific rule was designed to prohibit the admission
of the victim's prior sexual conduct to avoid potential jury prejudice
against her. By excluding such matter generally, the rule dissociates the
prior sexual behavior of the victim from the existence vel non of consent
in cases where the defendant asserts consent as a defense. Rule 412
contains exceptions, one of which states that previous sexual acts are
admissible when "offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the
accused was or was not... the source of... injury .... -45 This excep-
tion was aptly illustrated in a sad case involving the rape of an eight-
year-old child. In United States v. Begay, 46 the prosecution relied heavily
on medical testimony indicating the child was penetrated, but the trial
court refused to allow evidence that the child had been abused by an-
other man three months earlier. If permitted, the doctor would have
testified that the indicia of penetration exhibited during the examination
could be explained either by the current or the past abuse. The Tenth
Circuit held that the failure to allow inquiry into the previous assault was
not only evidentiary error, but constitutional error, since the confronta-
tion clause was implicated. The court must find such constitutional er-
rors are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to affirm the conviction.
The conviction in this case was reversed and remanded for a new trial
because the court was not convinced the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
II. EXTRINSIC AcTS AND CREDIBILITY
The admission of prior crimes and other extrinsic conduct for the
purpose of demonstrating a witness's lack of credibility is governed by
Rules 608 and 609. These rules generate nearly as much litigation as
Rule 404. The tension lies between the probative impact of felonious
character and wishful thinking that each accused person should stand in
the dock on equal footing, subjected only to evidence about the immedi-
ate charges and unhaunted by a wayward past.4 7 If a criminal defendant
does not testify, her prior convictions are generally inadmissible. If the
defendant does testify, her credibility is at issue, as is some prior con-
duct which bears on that credibility.
In some circuits, the courts have attempted to mediate these ten-
sions by requiring the trial court to make explicit findings in which the
probative value of prior crimes for impeachment is weighed against prej-
44. Id. at 575.
45. FED. R. EVID. 412.
46. 937 F.2d 515 (10th Cir. 1991).
47. Historically, convicted felons were deemed incompetent to testify at all. The use
of prior convictions to impeach is more rooted in this historic disability than in a rational
relationship between crime and truth-telling. When felons became competent to testify,
the vestiges of the disability appeared in statutes and rules allowing prior felonies to be
shown for the purpose of affecting the witness's credibility. See 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, Evi-
DENCE § 488 (Chadborne rev. 1979).
970 [Vol. 69:4
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udicial impact.48 This balancing is required by Rule 609(a),4 9 but the
Tenth Circuit has held that a trial court's failure to make explicit find-
ings in determining the admissibility of prior convictions is not a revers-
ible error.50 Indeed, a review of the Tenth Circuit cases involving a
challenge to the admission of prior crimes evidence reveals no reversals.
Defense counsel often confront a tactical difficulty when their cli-
ents with prior convictions intend to testify. First, counsel must deter-
mine which, if any, of the defendant's acts will be admitted,
accomplished by a motion in limine. If some or all of the evidence is
ruled admissible, defense counsel must decide whether to raise these
matters on direct examination to avoid the appearance of hiding the de-
fendant's criminal record when the prosecution cross-examines. Most
defense counsel believe that coming forward with the defendant's prior
crimes is better, but doing so limits their ability to challenge the trial
court's admissibility ruling on appeal. In United States v. Davis,5 1 the de-
fendant moved in limine to exclude a guilty plea entered in a prior drug
case. His motion was denied, so defendant raised the conviction him-
self, apparently to demonstrate that he was the type to plead guilty when
he was guilty, but would go to trial where, as now, he was not guilty.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the admission of the prior conviction was
not reversible error when the defendant raised the issue as evidence of
his own innocence.
5 2
Similarly, in United States v. Galloway,5" the defense counsel in a rape
prosecution decided to use defendant's prior convictions as a way of il-
lustrating that the defendant and the victim were "from two different
worlds" and that they misunderstood each other's intentions. Even if
some of the prior convictions were inadmissible, the court ruled that this
argument was a legitimate tactical move that the court would not sec-
ond-guess.
54
In United States v. Sides,55 the defendant, on trial for murder commit-
ted in the course of a robbery, made a motion in limine to exclude his
prior convictions for robbery and aggravated battery. The trial judge
reserved ruling on the motion, and when it came time for defendant to
testify, defense counsel brought out the prior convictions on direct. The
48. See United States v. Rosales, 680 F.2d 1304, 1306 (10th Cir. 1981).
49. FED. R. EvID. 609(a) provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall
be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
50. Rosales, 680 F.2d at 1304.
51. 929 F.2d 554 (10th Cir. 1991).
52. Id. at 558.
53. 937 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1991).
54. Id. at 545.
55. 944 F.2d 1554 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S.Ct. 604 (1991).
1992]
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Tenth Circuit ruled that in the absence of a contemporaneous objection,
the admission of the prior convictions would be reviewed only for plain
error, and the court concluded any error in the admission of the prior
convictions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given the over-
whelming evidence of defendant's guilt.5 6
While the catch-22 illustrated by the three preceding cases is not
new, it remains a grim reminder that the policies surrounding the admis-
sibility of prior convictions are more hortatory than consequential. The
rules of evidence operate more as guidelines honored only if a party's
case is not strong enough to overcome their violation. Even the direct
violation of a court order prohibiting the introduction of prior crimes
evidence may not constitute reversible error. In United States v. Short,5 7 a
drug prosecution, the trial judge ruled in limine that if the defendant tes-
tified, the prosecution could cross-examine with respect to the defend-
ant's prior felony conviction, but would not be allowed to reveal that the
conviction was drug-related. When the prosecutor began cross exami-
nation he immediately asked:
"Q. Mr. Short, you're a convicted felon, aren't you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that was a drug-related felony, wasn't it?
A. Yes, sir.
s5 8
At the next break, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's violation
of the judge's earlier ruling and asked for a mistrial. The trial judge
reconsidered the earlier ruling in light of the direct testimony and de-
cided the questioning about the prior drug conviction was proper. The
motion for mistrial was denied. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the scenario
by first assuming that the admission of the prior conviction was an abuse
of discretion and prejudicial to the defendant, then by concluding that
its admission was harmless given the overwhelming evidence against the
defendant. The result: Neither the trial court nor the court of appeals
ever engaged in the actual balancing of probative value and prejudicial
effect required by Rule 609(a).59 No appellate decision addressed
whether admission of the prior crime was erroneous, and although the
prosecutor's conduct was "not condone[d]," 6 ° there were absolutely no
operational consequences attendant to the prosecutor's violation of the
court's order.
Not only are prior crimes admissible to impeach a testifying defend-
ant, inquiry is also permitted, if the court allows, into any extrinsic act
probative of the witness's credibility. Under Rule 608(b),6 1 the cross-
56. Id. at 1560.
57. 947 F.2d 1445 (10th Cir. 1991).
58. Id. at 1453.
59. It has been argued that deference to the trial court's discretion should not render
the trial court's ruling virtually unreviewable. "This distends the notion of discretion....
The fact that the established standards may be vague or difficult to apply does not mean
the courts have discretion to ignore those standards." VictorJ. Gold, Do the Federal Rules of
Evidence Matter?, 25 Loy. L.A. REV. 909, 917-18 (1992).
60. Id. at 1455.
61. FED. R. EvID. 608(b) provides:
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examiner may ask questions about such acts, but he is bound by the
witness' answer and may not use extrinsic evidence to prove the conduct
if the witness denies it. In United States v. Drake,62 the defendant was
charged with mail fraud in the course of his direct testimony and cross-
examination, the defendant made reference to his educational back-
ground and college degrees. By the time the cross-examination was fin-
ished, the defendant had been asked whether the "records" would
reflect that he was kicked out of the University of Illinois for falsifying
facts in a disciplinary investigation. The Tenth Circuit correctly ruled
that inquiry into these matters was proper under Rule 608(b). The only
real issue was whether the prosecutor should have been allowed to make
the inquiry by referring to matters appearing in the defendant's
"records" that were (appropriately) not admitted into evidence. The
Court ruled that this style of questioning was improper, but harmless
error. In other words, a good faith basis must exist before the cross-
examiner may ask questions about extrinsic conduct, so it was entirely
proper for the prosecution to have consulted the defendant's college
records. The cross-examination itself, however, should not have been
conducted with reference to the extrinsic evidence, but only through in-
quiry into the conduct itself.
6 3
Rule 608 applies to all witnesses who testify, and the prohibition
against extrinsic evidence about extrinsic conduct under that rule pre-
vents courts from becoming embroiled in truly tangential matters. In
United States v. Young,64 the defendant was charged with stealing from
her employer by opening a bank account in the employer's name and
depositing his funds therein. She later withdrew funds for her personal
use. The defendant wanted to demonstrate that the employer who testi-
fied against her had accused another employee of embezzlement and,
therefore, was not credible in this case. When the employer denied he
had done so, the defendant was "stuck with the answer" and was pre-
cluded from introducing the former employee to contradict the em-
ployer. This result would be the same whether the original question to
the employer was considered an extrinsic act under Rule 608 or under
404(b). If the latter, Rule 611 has generally been interpreted to prevent
extrinsic evidence where the impeachment matter is collateral. 65
Similarly, a defendant who sought to use prior crimes evidence
(b) SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT. Specific instances of the conduct of a wit-
ness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other
than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic
evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truth-
fulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness
(I) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or
(2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another wit-
ness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not
operate as a waiver of the accused's, or the witness' privilege against self-incrimi-
nation when examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility.
62. 932 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1991).
63. Id. at 867.
64. 952 F.2d 1252 (10th Cir. 1991).
65. Id. at 1259.
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against a prosecution witness was limited in how he might do so. In
United States v. Thomas,6 6 one of the prosecution witnesses testifying
against the defendant admitted to one prior conviction and when the
defendant wanted to prove that the witness had a second conviction by
offering the court records through a court clerk, the government offered
to so stipulate. The record was admitted, but the clerk was not permit-
ted to testify. The Tenth Circuit ruled that this procedure fully com-
plied with Rule 609(a).
6 7
III. EXPERT TESTIMONY
The use of expert testimony has greatly increased despite its ex-
pense, at least partly in response to the broad and easily met require-
ments of Rule 702.68 Among the issues that continue to confront the
courts are the overuse of expert testimony where it is not warranted and
the reliability of expert testimony.
The Tenth Circuit has taken a liberal approach to the admission of
expert testimony, and in the three cases decided in 1991, which arguably
represent the overuse 69 of expert testimony, none of the instances war-
ranted reversal, nor did the Court express serious reservations. In
McEwen v. City of Norman, Okla.,70 a motorcyclist's estate brought a
§ 1983 action against the police and the city claiming excessive force
was used during the chase and in the arrest of the motorcyclist after he
collided with a police car. The defendants presented Samuel Chapman,
a professor of political science and the director of the Law Enforcement
Administration degree program at the University of Oklahoma, who tes-
tified that he did not believe that the officers "intended" to establish a
roadblock. Chapman did not believe that one of the police officers had
"rolled" McEwen back and forth with his foot or used excessive force as
testified by others. Chapman agreed that the police officer should not
have been subjected to any disciplinary action arising out of his encoun-
ter with McEwen, and that this latter opinion was based in part on Chap-
man's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses he heard testify
during the trial.
7 1
The plaintiff filed a motion in limine to prevent the testimony of this
66. 945 F.2d 328 (10th Cir. 1991).
67. Id. at 330.
68. FED. R. EVID. 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
69. There is some overlap between FED. R. EVID. 702 and FED. R. EVID. 704(a). The
latter states: "Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion
or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact." While testimony on the "ultimate issue" is thus
not proscribed, the Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 704 caution that Rules 701 and
702 provide "ample assurances against the admission of opinions which would merely tell
the jury what results to reach, somewhat in the manner of the oath-helpers in an earlier
day." FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note.
70. 926 F.2d 1539 (10th Cir. 1991).
71. Id. at 1546.
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witness, but it was denied. Plaintiff's counsel made no contemporane-
ous objections to any of the testimony. The trial court gave a cautionary
instruction to the jury, noting that Chapman had been permitted to tes-
tify to some matters "within [his] common knowledge," and telling the
jury that they were not to surrender their "complete independence in
finding the facts as you believe they exist from the evidence .... -72
The Tenth Circuit held first that the lack of objection made the ad-
mission reviewable only under the plain error rule, and concluded no
plain error existed. The court stated that Chapman "did render opin-
ions ... which indicated to the jury the precise result the jurors should
reach based on the evidence."'7 3 But the court also stated, "Arguably,
his testimony was proper under Rules 702 and 704 .... ,74 Thus, the
court never decided whether the testimony was correctly admitted or
not. The question was avoided because of the lack of a contemporane-
ous objection.
The utility of expert testimony was also an issue in United States v.
McDonald,7 5 a criminal prosecution for possession of crack cocaine with
intent to distribute. A supervisor for the Denver Metro Crack Task
Force with extensive training concerning cocaine and cocaine trafficking
was permitted to testify over objections about the significance of the
quantity of the cocaine involved, its street value, how crack was cut and
packaged, and that crack dealers commonly possess beepers, single-
edged razor blades, and large quantities of cash and food stamps.
The Tenth Circuit examined this testimony asking whether, under
Rule 702, the officer's specialized knowledge would assist the trier of
fact in understanding the evidence, stating it was a common sense in-
quiry into whether a juror would be able to understand the evidence
without specialized knowledge concerning the subject. 76 The court had
no difficulty concluding that information about the quantity of the drugs
and the use of pagers, beepers, razors and weapons would help the ju-
rors understand the evidence. Somewhat less convincing was the court's
allowance of expert testimony concerning the cash and food stamps.
The court asked, "Why would someone have such a large quantity of
money and food stamps upon his person? Without understanding the
drug trade is a cash-and-carry business, and that both cash and food
stamps are the medium of exchange in a drug transaction, the basic evi-
dence would leave a juror puzzled."'7 7 It is certainly unlikely that the
admission of expert testimony on these matters was reversible error, but
it appears the court gave jurors little credit for being able to draw an
obvious inference that any prosecutor could argue without the support
of expert testimony.
72. Id. at 1543-44.
73. Id. at 1546. See supra note 68, the Advisory Committee comment on the impropri-
ety of such opinions.
74. Id.
75. 933 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S.Ct. 270 (1991).
76. Id. at 1522.
77. Id.
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The third case requiring the court to distinguish between admissi-
ble expert testimony that assists the jury, even on the ultimate issue, and
inadmissible expert testimony, which merely tells the jury how to decide
the case, was Wheeler v. John Deere Co..78 In that case, a mechanical engi-
neer with special expertise in the safe design of farm equipment was
allowed to testify that a combine was "dangerous beyond the expecta-
tion of the ordinary user,"7 9 a phrase reflecting a legal standard gov-
erning the case. The Tenth Circuit held this testimony was within the
engineer's expertise and, given the technical nature of the case, "could
have assisted the jury."8 0
It will be interesting to see whether or not the proposed amend-
ments to Rule 702 will affect these holdings. The new language permits
the expert opinion testimony only if the "information is reasonably reli-
able and will substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue .... ,"81 The Advisory Committee
Notes to the proposal indicate more concern with the reliability of opin-
ions based on questionable science than with the overuse of opinion tes-
timony where it merely tells the jury how to decide the case.
8 2
The Wheeler case raises the second commonly litigated issue arising
in connection with the use of expert testimony: The sufficiency of the
qualifications of experts to render opinions on certain topics. In
Wheeler, for example, the court allowed the plaintiff's psychiatrist to tes-
tify that "momentary forgetfulness" was a human factor that should
have been considered in designing the combine that injured the plain-
tiff. The court noted the doctor might not have been the "optimal" wit-
ness to speak on factors governing product design, but his lack of
specialization only affected the weight of his testimony and not its
admissibility."3
Quinton v. Farmland Industries, Inc.84 illustrated the Tenth Circuit's
liberal approach on the specialization issue. In that case a doctor of vet-
erinary medicine was allowed to testify about the effect of substances on
dairy cows, although he was not a specialist in the field of toxicology.
The one case reversed by the Tenth Circuit for an error in the treat-
ment of expert testimony was Werth v. Makita Electric Works, Ltd..85 In
that case, the judge excluded the opinions of two of the plaintiff's ex-
perts, effectively precluding the presentation of the plaintiff's theory of
how the accident (involving the severing of plaintiff's fingers by a circu-
lar saw) occurred. The experts went to the plaintiff's home, set up the
tables and other physical conditions existing at the time of the injury,
and examined evidence, such as the location of blood spatters and the
78. 935 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1991).
79. Id. at 1100.
80. Id. at 1100-01.
81. FED. R. EVID. 702 (Proposed Amendments 1991)(emphasis added).
82. Id. (Advisory committee's note).
83. Wheeler v.John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090, 1101 (10th Cir. 1991).
84. 928 F.2d 335 (10th Cir. 1991).
85. 950 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1991).
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defendant's severed fingers, to testify about the action of the saw and its
location at the time of the injury. The trial court seemed troubled that
neither expert simply turned on the saw to see how it operated, and
excluded their testimony for lack of an adequate factual basis for the
opinion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that there was certainly
no per se rule requiring an accident reconstructionist to actually test the
instrumentalities involved. The court also held that technical kinetic
principles formed a sufficient scientific basis to support the experts'
opinions and would have been helpful to the jury.
86
One area in which expert testimony probably would assist the trier
of fact is a criminal defendant's state of mind, but Rule 704(b) expressly
excludes this type of testimony for policy reasons.8 7 Because of this
proscription, a defendant charged with aggravated sexual abuse, assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm, assault resulting in
serious bodily injury and burglary is not permitted to present the testi-
mony of a psychiatrist that a person with borderline personality disorder
(like the defendant) who consumes drugs and alcohol (as the defendant
did) is incapable of forming specific intent.
8 8
Finally, the case of Polys v. Trans-Colorado Airlines8 9 serves as a re-
minder that the imperatives of Rule 103 can be used as a rigid barrier to
appellate relief. In that case the plaintiff asserted he suffered head inju-
ries in a plane crash that produced disabling psychological and psychiat-
ric effects. The trial court excluded the depositions of two of the
plaintiff's experts who apparently would have bolstered the plaintiff's
evidence on damages. The problem was that the plaintiff made no offer
of proof as to what the deposition testimony would have been, although
bits and pieces came out during the trial. The Tenth Circuit, faced with
an incomplete record, used all the appellate deference it could muster in
affirming the trial court, stating that "absent offers of proof, we cannot
review the district court's ruling [which excludes the deposition testimo-
nies] for abuse of discretion. ... [The] ruling was not plain error. It was
not error and, even if it was, it did not affect a substantial right of the
[plaintiffs]. Therefore, we will not reverse the district court." 90
IV. HEARSAY
The rule against hearsay often presents interesting and complex
problems. The rule does not, however, actually exclude much hearsay
because of the many exceptions available. A review of the Tenth Circuit
86. Id. at 654.
87. FED. R. EVID. 704(b) provides:
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an ele-
ment of the crime charged or a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters
for the trier of fact alone.
88. United States v. Dennison, 937 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1991).
89. 941 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1991).
90. Id. at 1411.
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cases addressing hearsay reveals that the contested evidence was consid-
ered admissible in five out of six cases.
Two cases addressed whether the out-of-court statements were of-
fered for the truth of the matter asserted, the fundamental attribute of
hearsay. In Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co.,91 the plaintiff in an age dis-
crimination case introduced a document outlining the cost savings ob-
tainable by terminating older, rather than younger employees. The
document was not written by the employer, so it was not a party admis-
sion, but it appeared that the employer had access to the conclusions
contained in the document. The dispositive point, however, was that the
document was not offered to prove the truth of its contents, but to show
that the employer might have been influenced by its contents and was
motivated to fire senior employees first.
9 2
United States v. Bowser 93 also determined that an out-of-court state-
ment was offered for a purpose other than the truth of the matter as-
serted, but with more troubling results. In that case, the defendant was
convicted of selling drugs to anundercover agent. The agent was per-
mitted to testify that an out-of-court declarant told the agent that the
defendant carried a gun and wanted to kill the agent. The defendant
challenged this evidence on both relevance and hearsay grounds, but
the Tenth Circuit opinion conflated the two issues, concluding that the
evidence was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted, i.e., that defendant carried a gun and intended to
kill the agent. The statements were introduced, the court stated,
"merely to explain the officer's aggressive conduct toward the defend-
ant. In that context, the statements were relevant." 9 4 The opinion gave
no hint as to why the officer's aggressive conduct was relevant, nor did
the court discuss whether the probative value of the evidence was more
probative than prejudicial under Rule 403. Merely suggesting a non-
hearsay use for an out-of-court statement did not render the statement
admissible; the non-hearsay use must meet all other requirements of ad-
missibility. Additionally, evidence of weapon possession or threats to
kill can be characterized as other crimes, wrongs or acts barred by Rule
404(b). This type of evidence required a much more thorough inquiry
to justify admission for a proper purpose.9 5 Although the error may not
have seriously affected the entire record, the court's treatment of the
issue left all of these questions unresolved.
Two cases addressed hearsay issues that were relatively easy given
the facts provided. In those cases the rules were mechanically applied,
and the counter-arguments had little merit. In United States v. Esparsen,
9 6
a witness was permitted to testify to the out-of-court statements of a
co-conspirator. Such statements were admissible under Rule
91. 941 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1991).
92. Id. at 1423.
93. 941 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1991).
94. Id. at 1021.
95. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
96. 930 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1991).
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801(d) (2) (e),97 and were admissible against all parties so long as the
conspiracy was established by a preponderance of the evidence, which
can include the statements themselves as well as independent evi-
dence. 98 Once the court concluded that sufficient evidence of the con-
spiracy existed, the statements were deemed admissible.
The application of another hearsay exception was examined in In re
Lynde,99 a case in which the petitioners sought release of grand jury tes-
timony foruse in a state court civil proceeding. The petitioners were
sued on a promissory note executed in favor of one Rienks and his wife.
Rienks had given grand jury testimony that may have revealed facts
about fraud in connection with the transaction. Rienks then died. The
petitioners sought the disclosure of the transcript to defend against the
suit on the note.
The release of grand jury testimony was permitted only upon a
showing of particularized need, and the petitioners' need could be
shown only if the testimony were admissible in their trial. The court
cited Colorado Rule of Evidence 804 (b)(1), 10 0 which is identical to the
federal rule, and concluded that the grand jury testimony could not
qualify under the former testimony hearsay exception because the party
against whom it would be offered (Mrs. Rienks) did not have an oppor-
tunity or similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or
redirect examination. The court would not disclose the grand jury testi-
mony because (among other reasons) it did not appear that petitioners
could have obtained its admission into evidence.101
The relationship between Rules 803(6)102 (the business records ex-
ception) and 803(8)103 (the governmental records exception) was left
97. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) provides: "(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A state-
ment is not hearsay if-.. .(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against
a party and is ... (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy."
98. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
99. 922 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1991).
100. CoLo. R. EvID. 804(b)(1) provides:
Former Testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or
a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the
course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testi-
mony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest,
had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross,
or redirect examination.
101. In re Lynde, 922 F.2d at 1455.
102. FED. R. EvID. 803(6) provides:
Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data com-
pilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at
or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowl-
edge, if kept in the course or a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was
the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or
other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or cir-
cumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business"
as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession,
occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
103. FED. R. EVID. 803(8) provides:
Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements or data compilations, in any
form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or
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unclear in Haskell v. United States Dept. of Agric. 104 In that case, an investi-
gative aide visited defendant's grocery store on several occasions and
wrote immediate reports documenting violations of the rules governing
food stamps, such as the exchange of food stamps for ineligible items.
These "transaction" reports were made whether a violation was de-
tected or not, and were signed by the special agent assigned to the inves-
tigation. The investigative aide was killed in an automobile collision.
The Department of Agriculture, nonetheless, brought an action to dis-
qualify the defendant's store from the food stamp program, using the
transaction reports. The Tenth Circuit upheld the admission of the re-
ports under the business records exception, relying on Abdel v. United
States, 105 an almost identical Seventh Circuit case. The Tenth Circuit
stated, "This conclusion is consistent with numerous cases holding that
records and reports, prepared in the regular course of federal agency
law enforcement investigations, are admissible under hearsay excep-
tions." 106 The opinion then cited several cases, without indicating
whether the basis for admission was Rule 803(6) or Rule 803(8).
Both sections allow the admission of reports of regularly conducted
activity and both give the trial court discretion to exclude reports where
the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trust-
worthiness. It may make little difference which rule is invoked. How-
ever, there is no explanation in the opinion why the business records
exception was chosen instead of the governmental records exception
when the report in question was of the latter type.
Finally, an appropriate and useful deployment of the residual ex-
ception 10 7 to the rule against hearsay occurred in United States v. Treff.108
In that case, the defendant, a former IRS employee, allegedly.killed his
wife, took his children to a motel, then drove to the home of his former
supervisor at the IRS and threw a molotov cocktail on the roof. Defend-
ant was convicted of an attempt to kill the supervisor, among other
charges. Defendant and his wife had marital difficulties, and on advice
agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which
matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases, matters
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil
actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual
findings resulting from an investigation make pursuant to authority granted by
law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
104. 930 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1991).
105. 670 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1982).
106. Haskell, 930 F.2d at 819 (emphasis added).
107. FED. R. EvID. 803(24) and FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(5). These rules allow the admis-
sion of evidence of otherwise admissible if the court finds:
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general pur-
poses of these rules and the interests ofjustice will best be served by admission of
the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under
this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party suffi-
ciently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the state-
ment and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
108. 924 F.2d 975 (10th Cir. 1991).
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of her lawyer, she had been keeping a diary of her husband's conduct.
Investigators found the diary with an entry made the day before she was
killed: "Robert ... still angry and upset mood. Finally asked if state
would pay medical bills if he committed himself because he wanted to
kill self and Fay."' 0 9 (Fay was defendant's supervisor.) The wife's hand-
writing was identified by her sister, and the prosecution sought its ad-
mission to prove intent to kill the supervisor.
After eliminating the possibility that marital privilege might exclude
the evidence, 110 the trial court found that the diary had circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness and that the prosecution provided ade-
quate notice to defense counsel of his intent to use the diary entry at
trial. The Tenth Circuit opinion agreed with the trial court's conclu-
sions without much comment and the conviction was affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's evidence jurisprudence consistently utilizes all
the mechanisms available to avoid reversing trial court rulings on evi-
dentiary matters. These mechanisms serve the interests of efficiency and
also the interests of justice when the case as a whole is not affected by
the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence. However, care must
be taken lest the easy litanies of the plain and harmless error rules result
in the sacrifice of meaningful appellate enforcement of the rules of evi-
dence. Without appellate guidance, the trial courts' exercises of discre-
tion are effectively insulated from review altogether. Then the Rules of
Evidence themselves will matter very little.
109. Id. at 982.
110. Id.
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